Economic Freedom, Human Rights, and the Returns to Human Capital: An Evaluation of the Schultz Hypothesis by King, Elizabeth M. et al.
Economics Publications Economics
10-2012
Economic Freedom, Human Rights, and the
Returns to Human Capital: An Evaluation of the
Schultz Hypothesis
Elizabeth M. King
World Bank
Claudio E. Montenegro
World Bank
Peter F. Orazem
Iowa State University, pfo@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the International Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/268. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
 
Economic Freedom, Human Rights, and the Returns to Human Capital: An Evaluation of
the Schultz Hypothesis
Author(s): Elizabeth M. King, Claudio E. Montenegro and  Peter F. Orazem
Source: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 61, No. 1 (October 2012), pp. 39-
72
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666948
Accessed: 02-11-2016 14:03 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Economic Development and Cultural Change
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:03:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Economic Freedom, Human Rights, and the Returns
to Human Capital: An Evaluation of the
Schultz Hypothesis
elizabeth m. king
World Bank
claudio e. montenegro
World Bank and Universidad de Chile
peter f. orazem
Iowa State University and IZA
I. Introduction
Hundreds of studies measure the private returns to schooling, most focusing
on a single country or a subset of countries. Following Mincer (1974), infer-
ence on returns to schooling and work experience are derived from the regres-
sion coefﬁcients of log earnings on years of schooling and quadratic terms in
age. Due mainly to George Psacharopolous and his colleagues (Psacharopoulos
1973, 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004), we have compilations of es-
timated returns to schooling across many countries. These estimates show re-
markable consistencies. Despite differences in estimation methods, speciﬁca-
tions, and level of economic development, virtually all studies show that
earnings rise with years of schooling and increase at a declining rate in age or
work experience.1 In almost all data sets, the largest percentage annual wage
gains are captured by the youngest workers. The wage gain from additional ex-
perience gets smaller and may even turn negative with age.
Responsibility for the contents of this article is entirely ours and should not be attributed to our af-
ﬁliated institutions.We are grateful for suggestions and comments received from the referees and from
attendees at the Inter-American Development Bank, the Midwest Economics Meetings, the Minne-
sota International Economic Development Conference, and the Festschrift for T. Paul Schultz, Center
for Global Development, Washington, DC. Supplementary materials are on our website at http://
www2.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/orazem/Appendix_K_O_M_2012.pdf.
1 This is despite also well-known differences in the quality of schooling across countries and across
levels of schooling in those countries, a point that Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) and Hanushek
and Zhang (2009) make. In addition, what is interpreted as returns to acquired human capital may
reﬂect also returns to innate ability for which there are no common measures.
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If factors ﬂow easily across markets, the marginal returns to factors are equal-
ized. For example, when measured properly, the marginal product of physical
capital is found to be nearly equal across rich and poor countries (Lucas 1990;
Caselli and Feyrer 2007), implying that credit constraints do not retard capital
investments in developing countries. But while physical capital ﬂows easily
across countries human capital does not. Therefore, there could be substantial
variation in the marginal returns to human capital even though earnings func-
tions display similar patterns across countries.
In fact, returns per year of schooling tend to vary within a narrow range
across developed countries. Estimated private returns in the United States
range narrowly around 10%, despite differences in data sets andmethodologies
employed. Returns to schooling in other developed countries are similar to
those in the United States.2 But the narrow differences could be explained by
the fact that labor ﬂows relatively easily across rich countries compared to labor
ﬂows between poor and rich countries. For this reason, returns to human cap-
ital are relatively unequal across developing countries, an expectation borne out
by the data. Indeed, estimated returns to an additional year of schooling or to
an additional year of age vary tremendously across those countries.3
The average return to schooling estimated for 86 developing countries using
122 data sets is 8%, which is reasonably consistent with returns estimated for
developed countries. However, the variation across countries is substantial
(ﬁg. 1A). The 90th percentile return is more than three times the 10th percen-
tile return. The corresponding distribution of returns to experience across
the same countries shows that the 90th percentile return to experience is over
seven times larger than the 10th percentile return (ﬁg. 1B). Given the important
role that human capital plays in economic development, it is important to un-
derstand why these differences in returns arise and why they persist across
countries.
Theodore W. Schultz (1975) advanced an important hypothesis for why re-
turns to human capital (education and experience) vary across markets. He ar-
gued that human capital is most valuable in the presence of unexpected price,
productivity, or technology shocks that require people to reallocate time and
resources. Economic or political institutions that restrict responses to those
shocks, such as by limiting migration or transfers of capital, will lower returns
to skill. In a steady state, where there are no shocks, traditional rules of thumb
2 See table 4 in Card (1999) for a summary of recent estimated returns to schooling in developed
countries. Recent reviews of returns to schooling in developing countries include Orazem and King
(2008) and Montenegro and Patrinos (2009).
3 In our investigation of 122 developing country data sets, only two failed to generate positive
returns to schooling and seven failed to generate rising returns to age.
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are efﬁcient. When skilled individuals are not exposed to shocks that require
resource allocation decisions or when they are denied the freedom to make
those decisions, they are not able to capture the economic returns from their
skills, thus weakening the demand for more skill acquisition.
A ﬁrst inspection of the data supports the hypothesis that freer economic in-
stitutions raise individual returns to human capital, measured narrowly by
years of schooling. We divide 86 developing countries into three groups based
on their relative ranking in the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom In-
Figure 1. Histograms of estimated returns to schooling and to potential work experience across develop-
ing countries. A, Distribution of returns to education across 122 developing country households data sets.
B, Distribution of returns to experience across 122 developing country household data sets.
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dex,4 with the 25% least free economies in one group, the 25% freest in another
group, and the rest in the middle group (ﬁg. 2). We then plot the relationship
between estimated returns to schooling and real gross domestic product per cap-
ita, ameasure of a country’s level of economic development. The private returns
to schooling in the freest economies average 9.7% per year of schooling, 3 per-
centage points higher than the average returns in the least free economies.5 Re-
turns for the middle group fall between the two groups. Repeating this analysis
for private returns to years of experience, average returns are highest in the freest
economies (1.6%), as compared with the middle (1.5%) and least free (1.4%)
economies (ﬁg. 3).
T. Paul Schultz (1998) found that about 70% of the income inequality in
the world is due to country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects that would include the impacts
of country-speciﬁc political and economic institutions on earnings.6 Acemoglu
4 Information on the Heritage Foundation Index is available at http://www.heritage.org/research
/features/index/chapters/pdfs/Index2006_Chap5.pdf.
5 We use private returns to schooling, as those are the ones that motivate individual time allocation
choices. Countries may dictate individual educational choices and time allocations in ways to
maximize social returns to schooling, but that would not correspond to Theodore W. Schultz’s focus
on the returns to individual choice.
6 Similar ﬁndings that 60%–70% of world income inequality is due to income inequality between
rather than within countries results are reported in reviews by Firebaugh (2003) and Milanovic
(2006). Firebaugh (2003, 92) argues that between-country inequality has fallen recently but that the
between-nation component of global inequality is still “as much as three times the size of the within-
nation component.”
Figure 2. Returns to schooling by level of development and economic freedom
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and Robinson (2005) argued that these institutions were formed in response to
exogenous inﬂuences existing at the time of a country’s founding and that these
institutions tend to persist across generations. We use measures of economic
and political institutions to determine if they indeed alter returns to human
capital sufﬁciently to explain part of the persistent cross-country income in-
equality. We ﬁnd that, consistent with Theodore W. Schultz’s hypothesis, hu-
man capital is signiﬁcantly more valuable in countries with greater economic
freedom. However, the people beneﬁting most from more liberal economic
and political institutions are those at the upper tail of the distribution of unob-
served abilities, suggesting that freeing human capital to seek its highest reward
comes at the expense of greater wage inequality.
II. Government Institutions and Individual Returns
Returns to managerial skills accrue from an individual’s ability to specialize ac-
cording to comparative advantage, an ability that depends not only on that in-
dividual’s characteristics but also on being able to trade surplus production
with others. The greater are the number of potential traders, the greater are the
returns from specialization, but government policies can expand or retard trad-
ing opportunities by raising or lowering transaction costs. As transaction costs
rise, the number of proﬁtable trades is reduced, as are the returns to specializa-
tion for talented individuals. In the limit, institutions that raise transaction
Figure 3. Returns to experience by level of development and economic freedom
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costs sufﬁciently will eliminate all trades and drive the returns to specialized
skills to zero (Yang 2003).
There are many ways that returns to skill will increase with specialization.
Rosen (1983) pointed out that returns to rare skills increase with the intensity
of their use, so, in the limit, the rarest skills can claim very large returns. Mur-
phy, Schleifer, and Vishny (1991) demonstrated that if the society does not ex-
propriate earnings excessively through taxes, the most able individuals will be-
come entrepreneurs and will be able to capture rising returns to their ability.
Their entrepreneurship also raises the economy’s total productivity (Romer
1986, 1990; Lucas 2002). If the trade opportunities are removed, then the re-
turns to the skills and the incentives to invest are diminished. Furthermore,
these trade opportunities have to be incorporated broadly in the expectations
of the citizenry in order to shift behavior. Lucas (2002, 17) argues: “Growth in
the stock of useful knowledge does not generate sustained improvement in liv-
ing standards unless it raises the return to investing in human capital in most
families. . . . For income growth to occur in a society, a large fraction of people
must experience changes in the possible lives they imagine for themselves and
their children, and these new visions of possible futures must have enough
force to lead them to change the way they behave, the number of children they
have, and the hopes they invest in their children.”
Economic and political institutions are critical to forming and perpetuating
these expectations. The studies by Acemoglu and his colleagues show that cur-
rent political and economic institutions in developing countries have roots that
go back centuries. Once installed, these institutions have a strong tendency to
persist,7 even as the countries face changing economic and political circum-
stances. That suggests that a test of the Schultz hypothesis would be to establish
whether returns to human capital are greatest in countries where economic or
political institutions expose citizens to more shocks and/or provide the citizens
with more freedom to adjust their time or resource allocations in response to
those shocks.
Theoretical models have explicitly linked returns to individual skills to the
institutions that regulate individual decision making. Murphy et al. (1991)
show that strong property rights, ease of ﬁrm entry, and larger markets will
cause themost able to become entrepreneurs, simultaneously increasing overall
growth and returns to skill. Rosen (1983) demonstrates that returns to special-
ized applications of skill to an activity increase as transaction costs fall and the
size of the market increases. Returns to skill also rise in the presence of more
efﬁcient matching institutions (Pissarides 2000). The common feature of these
7 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005, 316).
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models is that more efﬁcient gains from trade among agents create increasing
returns to skill.
A compelling clue that institutions affect returns to human capital comes
from the large increases in returns to education in the countries that tran-
sitioned from centrally planned economies to market systems.8 Returns to
schooling more than doubled from before to after the transition (Fleisher, Sa-
birianova, and Wang 2005). By 2000, returns in these economies were similar
to those estimated for Western Europe and North America. McMillan and
Woodruff (2002) argued that the successful transition economies were those
that fostered the entrepreneurial skills necessary to adapt to economic shocks.
If, according to Theodore W. Schultz (1975), the change from a more to a less
regulated economy increases the return to managerial skills because of the in-
creased need to adapt to shocks, then there should be similar evidence of eco-
nomic institutions explaining the variation in returns to schooling across all
countries and not just those in transition.9
Virtually all empirical work on the role of institutions is at the country level.
Moreover, there is no accepted menu of factors that should be used to measure
economic institutions, and the practice has been to use institutional measures
one at a time in separate growth equations.10 Because institutions may be highly
correlated with one another, the coefﬁcient attached to any given individual
measure may reﬂect the correlation between that measure and the excluded in-
stitutions. By necessity, studies that try to control for possible endogeneity of
economic institutions have to limit the number of institutions because the
number of plausible instruments is limited;11 consequently, studies that aim to
correct for endogeneity have to accept a higher probability of missing variables
bias.
Studies of institutional effects on labor market outcomes have tended to-
ward the opposite extreme: including an entire menu of labor market institu-
tions as regressors. For example, Nickell and Layard (1999) employ 10 mea-
sures of unionization, unemployment insurance, employment protection, tax
distortions, and other labor market policies to explain cross-country variation
in unemployment rates. Despite possible endogeneity bias, results using other
8 Orazem and Vodopivec (2009) used the Schultz hypothesis to explain rising returns to schooling
in Slovenia and for transition economies more generally.
9 The transition economy experience cannot tell us which institutions are important for returns to
human capital because many of these institutions, such as rule of law, protection of property rights,
wage ﬂexibility, monetary reforms, and exposure to international trade, were changing simultaneously.
10 Djankov, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2002) and Botero et al. (2004) are prominent examples
of this strategy.
11 For examples, see the various papers by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2005).
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data sets, additional institutional measures, and different time periods have
generally corroborated the ﬁndings that more interventionist labor market
policies exacerbate unemployment.12 Some researchers, including Nickell and
Layard (1999) and Heckman and Pages (2004), instrument for some, but not
all, labor market institutions; it would be virtually impossible to instrument for
all such institutions.
In this study, we employ a simple strategy of including many measures of
labor market institutions at once without correcting for endogeneity. Endo-
geneity is much less of a concern than omitted variable bias because political
and economic institutions persist over decades, such that individuals can form
accurate expectations and incorporate those expectations into their human
capital investment decisions. Moreover, since there is no consensus about
which institutions are important to individual decisionmaking, letting the data
speak seems less arbitrary than choosing a set menu of factors that could affect
economic or political freedom.
In this study, we estimate returns to human capital (years of schooling and
experience) over samples of individuals. This is consistent with the assumption
that individuals make their optimal time and resource allocation decisions in
response to perceived incentives.
III. Empirical Measures of Economic and Political Institutions
There are many ways that government regulations or policies affect an individ-
ual’s expectations regarding returns to investment or the trend or variation in
future economic variables. We apply different institutional measures that cap-
ture the themes in the literature. A general introduction to the measures is pre-
sented below.13
A. Economic Freedom
The closest measures of a country’s economic environment come under the
umbrella of economic freedom, those mechanisms that a government can use
to control sources of economic shocks and those policies that restrict the scope
of individual responses to those shocks. Policies that have been measured in-
clude the following: the effect of corruption (Murphy et al. 1991, 1993; Schlei-
fer and Vishny 1993; Bardhan 2005); property rights (Acemoglu et al. 2001,
2005; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005); rule of law or contract enforcement (Ace-
moglu and Johnson 2005; Bardhan 2005); constraints on entry (Djankov et al.
12 Examples include Blau and Kahn (2002), Heckman and Pages (2004), and Nickell, Nunziata,
and Ochel (2005).
13 Additional details about the measures are discussed in the supplemental material document
(http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/orazem/Appendix_K_O_M_2012.pdf ).
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2002); privatization of state enterprises (Frydman et al. 1999; Djankov and
Murrell 2002); and monetary policy (Acemoglu et al. 2003). However, these
policies are mutually reinforcing, working more in conjunction with one an-
other than in isolation. For that reason, it would make sense to include a larger
set of policies to measure economic freedom rather than only one or two.
We use the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom to measure
institutions governing individual economic decisions. The Heritage Founda-
tion has generated a comparable annual data series since 1994 across 163 coun-
tries on various aspects of economic freedom: the ease with which the team can
open or close a business, openness to trade, taxes relative to income, the impor-
tance of government in the economy, the quality of monetary policy, openness
to foreign investment, the lack of government restrictions on ﬁnancial or credit
markets, protection of property rights, and the lack of corruption in govern-
ment.14 Although we estimate the individual effects of the subcomponents of
the index, it seems clear that they are not independent. A single factor loading
from a factor analysis of the dimensions of the Heritage Index explains 92% of
the common variance among its subcomponents. Nevertheless, we also test
whether the individual subcomponents have an effect on returns to skill that
differs from the aggregate index.
B. Globalization
International trade and capital ﬂows increase a country’s exposure to shocks.
These and other avenues of integration into the international community could
affect returns to schooling. Foreign direct investment provides access to new
technologies that can complement domestic human capital. Xu (2000) argues
that countries can only attract foreign direct investment if they have a sufﬁcient
base of human capital. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that
openness to trade strengthened the property rights of merchants in Europe, in-
creasing their incentives to invest. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) provide
evidence that openness to foreign trade raises the impact of average cognitive
skills on economic growth. Openness to trade may also raise returns to human
capital, such as by increasing the cost of discrimination (Black and Brainerd
2004).
We use the Index of Globalization developed by Dreher (2006) for 155
countries for 1970–2006. Eleven countries were not covered in the index; we
ﬁlled the missing values with the ﬁtted values based on the Index of Political
14 We used the Heritage Foundation Indices that matched most closely the date of each country
household survey. For ﬁve countries that were not covered in the Heritage Foundation Index, we
used the ﬁtted values from regressions of the index on the six measures included in the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008).
King, Montenegro, and Orazem 47
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:03:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Globalization and the Heritage Foundation’s Trade Index. The Index of Glob-
alization is positively correlated with economic freedom (r5 0.58), but there
is sufﬁcient independent variation to capture a separate effect of openness to
international product and capital markets.
C. Empowerment Rights
Individual returns to schooling may depend also on the protection of political
rights—the right to act without fear of political retribution as opposed to the
economic retribution that would be generated by the country’s economic in-
stitutions. The Human Rights Data Set by Cingranelli and Richards (2005)
includes measures of personal freedoms for 198 countries for 1981–2004.15We
use the Empowerment Rights Index, which is constructed from various mea-
sures: freedom of movement within or out of the country, freedom of speech
without government censorship, freedom to participate in politics, freedom of
religion, and protection of worker rights. This index is positively correlated
with the Economic Freedom Index, but at 0.44 the correlation suggests that
the two indexes are not identical. We examine how the subcomponents of the
index perform relative to the aggregate index, although a single factor loading
explains virtually all of the common variation among the subcomponents.
Individuals’ political freedoms are not as clearly related to the pursuit of the
highest return to human capital as are economic freedoms, yet these freedoms
could contribute to a climate of creativity and innovation. Florida (2007) em-
phasizes that acceptance of individual differences fosters innovation and a cli-
mate of entrepreneurship.
D. Democracy
Presenting theory and evidence on the development of democracy, Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005) view economies ﬁrst developing with the elites control-
ling resource allocations and the masses lacking political power or economic
rewards. However, economic growth leads to improved education and eco-
nomic circumstances for the disenfranchised, who will be tempted to take con-
trol by force. The elites then relinquish some power by extending political con-
cessions to the middle and lower classes in order to avoid violent overthrow.
Democracy is therefore associated with broad dispersion of the beneﬁts of the
economy and greater political freedom. How this affects returns to schooling is
unclear. While democracy is positively correlated with rising per capita in-
comes, the effect is not causal. Furthermore, democracy leads to rising taxation
of land and capital, and so, in relative terms, it is the elites who lose and the
15 We use the data for the year that matches most closely the date of the country household survey.
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lower classes who gain. If the elites are the most educated, then democracy
would actually lower returns to schooling.
Democracy has been associated with a general presumption that decentral-
ized allocation of resources improves the efﬁciency of government services, in-
cluding education, health care, sanitation, and irrigation. Evaluations ﬁnd that
decentralized decision making does alter the allocation of resources (Alderman
2001; Faguet 2004; Galasso and Ravallion 2005), but it is less clear that the
resources are allocated in ways that improve desired outcomes. There are nu-
merous reasons why local control may yield poor outcomes. Bardhan (2002,
2005) argues that decentralized decisions are particularly prone to fail in devel-
oping countries where local ofﬁcials may be subject to undue inﬂuence by
prominent local families, there may be no tradition of monitoring of local of-
ﬁcials by residents, and local ofﬁcials may lack the necessary experience or skills
to manage resources effectively.
We use the Freedom House Imputed Polity measure, which rates countries
by their democratic institutions. The scale varies from zero to 10, with zero be-
ing least democratic and 10 beingmost democratic.One concern is that wemay
have trouble distinguishing the effects of democratic institutions from those of
economic and individual freedoms. In fact, democracies are more likely to have
more economic freedoms (r5 0.45) and are more likely to protect individual
political rights (r5 0.74).16 The variation across these countries enables us to
identify the independent effects of democratic institutions from those of eco-
nomic freedom or individual rights.
E. Equal Rights
Returns to education may depend on the distribution of opportunities or per-
sonal freedoms among demographic groups. Countries may have policies that
provide economic or political freedoms generally to the populace and yet deny
those freedoms to ethnic, racial, or religious minority groups or to women. Un-
equal access to economic mobility would certainly lower returns to schooling
for these disadvantaged groups, as has been shown in many studies of the effect
of discrimination on earnings. The unequal access could even limit returns to
schooling for members of the majority to the extent that the limitations on eco-
nomic freedom lower the efﬁciency of resource allocation in the economy as a
whole. The magnitude of this inefﬁciency due to the misallocation of resources
16 Nevertheless, there are exceptions. Democratic countries that offer above-average levels of
individual rights but below-average protection of those rights include Indonesia, Kenya, Turkey,
Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Haiti. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates score low on democracy
and individual rights, but they offer high levels of economic freedom. The Ukraine offers high levels
of democracy and individual rights but below-average economic freedoms.
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increases with the size of the group that faces discriminatory access. Clark
(2007) points to eighteenth-century England’s broad distribution of human
capital and its relatively egalitarian society as to why it, and not the more un-
equal China, India, or Japan, was ﬁrst to foster an industrial revolution.
Our measure of equal rights protection and access to economic opportunity
focuses on the rights of women. Comprising half the population, women are
a sufﬁciently large group to alter a country’s average returns to schooling. In
addition, measures of economic or political power that focus on women can
be easily compared across countries. We use the percentage of women in the
national legislature as our indication of equal access. Since 1997, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) has provided a measure of the percentage of seats
in the lower house parliament held by women for 188 countries. For the years
for which we do not have IPU data, we use Melander’s data, with an adjust-
ment made for the differences in measurement. Melander’s measure (2005) in-
cludes women in the upper house starting in 1965 and covering 175 countries.
There is little correlation between this measure of equal access and the other
measures of institutions. For example, there is virtually zero correlation be-
tween the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom and the fraction
of women in parliament.
IV. Do Economic and Political Freedoms Raise Returns to Schooling?
Private returns to schooling are estimated for 122 household data sets, repre-
senting 86 countries, using a standardMincerian earnings function.17 The data
sets used for the estimates are for the period 1989–2007, but about two-thirds
are from 2000 or later. A list of countries included, survey dates, and estimated
returns to schooling and experience can be found at http://www2.econ.iastate
.edu/faculty/orazem/Appendix_K_O_M_2012.pdf.
We standardize ourmeasure of the returns to schooling by applying the same
earnings speciﬁcation to each data set. A common speciﬁcation removes one
source of spurious variation in estimated returns across countries. For each
country j and year t, we estimate equations of the form
lnðwijtÞ5ajt 1 rjt Sijt 1 b1jt Aijt 1 b2jt A2ijt
1 o
K
k 5 1
bkjt X kijt 1 εijt ;
ð1Þ
17 We have repeated observations for some countries at different points in time. Four data sets are
from Chile, three each from Bulgaria, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay; two data sets are from
25 other countries.
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whereXkijt includesKmeasures of individual attributes, includingmarital status,
gender, and urban or rural residence. The estimated return per year of schooling
is rjt , the coefﬁcient on years of schooling, Sijt . The estimated return per year of
experience is bjt5 b1jt 1 2b2jt Ajt , computed at the average age in the country.
Investments in human capital are the most ubiquitous investment in the
world, so returns to human capital are appropriate measures of the returns to
individual investments in developing countries. Households that are liquidity
constrained are likely to invest ﬁrst in human capital before they invest in phys-
ical capital, and only when the anticipated return to an additional investment in
human capital falls to themarket return on physical capital will they diversify to
include physical capital.18 Even where the demand for formal schooling itself
may be low, households may still invest in labor force skills through work ex-
perience, and the return to an additional year of life will reﬂect the investment
in those skills. Figures 2 and 3 show that while there is considerable variation
in returns across countries for schooling and work experience, almost all are
positive, with returns to schooling and experience averaging 8.1% and 4.6%,
respectively.
There are different reasons why human capital generates returns, and we do
not argue for one or another here. As shown by T. Paul Schultz (1988), human
capital improves individual well-being along many dimensions, including bet-
ter decisions regarding health and fertility as well as labor market performance.
To the extent that these other decisions also improve labor market perfor-
mance, earnings capture, at least in part, several dimensions of better decision
making that result from human capital investments.
The 122 earnings functions are estimated separately using weighted least
squares.19 Because our estimated returns to experience and education are esti-
mates with estimated variances, we use the estimated generalized least squares
estimator, where the appropriate weights are the inverse of the standard error of
18 SeeBecker andTomes (1979, 1986) for the theoretical proof of this proposition.A large literature has
demonstrated that income shocks atypically cause poor households to reduce schooling investments,
while wealthier households absorb shocks, which is consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints
(Orazem and King 2008, 3521–34).
19 We can only include individuals in the regression if they work for a wage. That means that our
estimated returns are potentially subject to selection on labor supply. To investigate the importance
of selection, we also estimated the returns using a Heckman selection correction that used aggregate
household income and the presence of children as instruments in the probit selection equation.
As shown in supplemental material for this article (http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/orazem
/Appendix_K_O_M_2012.pdf ), OLS and selection-corrected returns are highly correlated, which
is consistent with the ﬁndings in Schultz (1999). We use the OLS estimates because only 90 data
sets incorporated sufﬁcient information to identify the selection equation, meaning a sacriﬁce of
26% of the sample if we limited the results to the selection-corrected set.
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the estimated return.20 The estimated return to schooling in country j in year t,
rjt, will reﬂect the institutional arrangements that affect the returns to skill in
each country. If there are L of these institutions, we can model the variation
in estimated returns to schooling and experience by
rjt 5 g0 1 o
L
l 5 1
gl Mljt 1 vrjt ;
bjt 5 d0 1 o
L
l 5 1
dl Mljt 1 vbjt :
ð2Þ
If the l th institution, Mljt, affects returns to schooling or experience, then
gl 6¼ 0 and dl 6¼ 0.We estimate (1) and (2) in two steps. The second stage cor-
rects for the heteroskedastic errors caused by an estimated dependent variable
and for clustering by country.21 Results for the cross-country rates of return re-
gressions are presented in table 1 for the entire working population and then
separately for men and women and separately for urban and rural residents.
Depending on the demographic sample, the regressions explain 15%–32% of
the cross-country variation in returns to schooling and 3%–10% of the cross-
country variation in returns to experience, suggesting that institutions have a
role in explaining why differences across countries in private returns to human
capital can arise and persist.
A. Economic Freedom
The prediction from the Schultz hypothesis that returns to human capital in-
crease with the presence of and ability to respond to shocks is broadly sup-
ported by the data. Higher levels of the Economic Freedom Index are strongly
positively correlated with returns to schooling (table 1). At sample means, the
elasticity is 0.55. A 10% increase in the index raises returns to schooling by
0.45 percentage points. Because countries at the 75th percentile of the Eco-
nomic Freedom Index have scores that are twice that of countries at the 25th
20 See Judge et al. (1980, 125–28). Note that the Stata weighted least squares program with
analytical weights requires that we specify the weight as the inverse of the variance rather than the
standard error. A similar estimation strategy was employed by Card and Krueger (1992) in their
evaluation of the role of school quality on returns to schooling in the United States.
21 The unit of observation is the market and not the individual, and so it is not appropriate to
weight these regressions by population. Nevertheless, we did perform a population-weighted
regression to examine how sensitive our results were to alternative speciﬁcations. Because India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan had such dominant population size compared to the rest of the countries,
standard weighting methods forced the coefﬁcients to “explain” those few large countries, effectively
negating the variation across economic institutions in the data. When we use an alternative of
eliminating the relatively few very large countries from the data set, we get results comparable to
those reported in this article.
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percentile, variation in economic freedom is capable of explaining considerable
variation in returns to schooling across countries. Point estimates suggest that
women beneﬁt more thanmen from freer institutions, although the differences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. More highly educated people in urban areas
beneﬁt signiﬁcantly more than rural residents from freer economic institu-
tions. In rural areas, where opportunities to proﬁt from education are more
limited, returns to schooling are largely unaffected by the extent to which in-
stitutions restrict economic activity, which is consistent with studies that show
education has less value in traditional economic settings and in rural markets.
Table 2 shows how subcomponents of the Heritage Index relate to estimated
returns. In this regression, the nine subcomponents of the Freedom Index were
inserted into the regression in table 1 in place of the overall index. Although the
estimated elasticities suggest that the overall index has the largest impact on re-
turns to schooling, we reject the hypothesis that it is the overall index that mat-
ters and not the parts. Several elements of economic freedom that have been
individually emphasized elsewhere as critical to economic growth, namely, the
share of private enterprise in the economy (freedom from government), protec-
tion of property rights, and openness to trade, signiﬁcantly increase returns to
schooling. Others, such as freedom from corruption or ﬁnancial freedom (lack
of restrictions on banking), actually lower returns. These ﬁndings suggest that a
country does not have to liberalize all regulations on economic decisions to en-
hance returns to schooling but that it also cannot rely on liberalization of a sin-
gle institution to capture the full return on its schooling investments.
Returns to experience are also signiﬁcantly affected by the level of economic
freedom in a country, with an elasticity of 0.80, evaluated at sample means.
This effect is sufﬁciently large to explain substantial differences in returns to
experience across countries. Point estimates suggest that the effect is nearly
identical between men and women in magnitude and signiﬁcance. Economic
freedom has a particularly large effect on returns to experience in urban mar-
kets, signiﬁcantly larger than its negligible impact in rural markets, although
this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Three individual subcomponents of the Economic Freedom Index signiﬁ-
cantly raise returns to experience. Two also raise returns to schooling: freedom
from government, which measures the importance of the private sector in the
economy, and the protection of property rights. Additionally, investment free-
dom, which is lack of restrictions on foreign or domestic purchase or sale of
stock, signiﬁcantly raises returns to experience. As with the returns to school-
ing, freedom from corruption and from banking regulations lower returns to
experience. The largest elasticity is with respect to the overall index and not any
one dimension of economic freedom, which is consistent with the earlier con-
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TABLE 2
WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES COEFFICIENTS AND ELASTICITIES OF THE ECONOMIC
FREEDOM INDEX AND ITS SUBCOMPONENTS
Heritage Foundation
Subindex
Marginal Returns to
Education
Marginal Returns to
Experience
Business Freedoma 2.003 .004
(.13)
[2.02]
(1.23)
[.10]
Freedom from Corruptiona 2.032* 2.010**
(1.74)
[2.11]
(2.07)
[2.19]
Financial Freedoma 2.056** 2.007**
(3.26)
[2.33]
(2.27)
[2.22]
Fiscal Freedoma .016 .003
(.41)
[.16]
(.31)
[.16]
Freedom from Governmenta .037** .011**
(1.80)
[.35]
(2.34)
[.56]
Investment Freedoma .002 .012**
(.12)
[.01]
(2.99)
[.40]
Monetary Freedoma .017 2.001
(.76)
[.14]
(.23)
[2.04]
Property Rightsa .064** .010**
(3.07)
[.34]
(2.49)
[.30]
Trade Freedoma .057** 2.005
(2.66)
[.43]
(1.21)
[2.21]
R 2 a .47 .25
x2(9)b 28.6** 30.8**
x2(8)c 28.4** 23.1**
Economic Freedom Indexd .081** .022**
(2.29)
[.55]
(2.75)
[.80]
Note. To correct for heteroskedasticity in the dependent variable, we use the in-
verse variance of the estimated returns to education and experience as analytical
weights in our Stata program. The t-statistics corrected for clustering by country are
reported in parentheses. Associated elasticities are in brackets.
a These are coefﬁcients from a regression of the form in col. 1 of table 1 with the
nine subindexes of the Freedom Index used in place of the aggregate index.
b Chi-square test of the joint signiﬁcance of the nine subindexes. Critical value at
the .05 level is 16.9.
c Chi-square test that the nine Economic Freedom subindexes can be replaced by
a single aggregate index. Critical value at the .05 level is 15.5.
d Coefﬁcients and t-statistics from table 1, col. 1, with associated elasticities.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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clusion that returns to human capital beneﬁt from liberal institutions across
several sectors as opposed to a single magic bullet that is key to returns to skill.
B. Globalization
Integration with global markets does not appear to affect returns to schooling,
and its effect on returns to experience is negative, at least in urban markets. A
plausible explanation is that foreign direct investments target sectors that em-
ploy younger workers, as appears true in at least some countries (World Bank
2009). Consistent with that presumption, the trade freedom component of the
Freedom Index increased returns to schooling but not returns to experience. As
we will see later, the possible beneﬁts from globalization becomemore apparent
when we add additional controls.
C. Empowerment Rights
Returns to schooling and experience are not strongly linked to protection of
individual political rights. The coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant for all population
groups and often negative, with elasticities below 0.1 in absolute value. Of the
individual components of the index, whose effects are summarized in table 3,
the only element that registers positively is the right to participate in politics,
which has a marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient but a negligible elasticity. The
contrast with the consistent importance of economic freedoms in enhancing
returns to human capital is striking. While political freedoms are rightly em-
phasized as fundamental human rights, it would seem that individual returns
to schooling and work experience can be maximized as long as economic free-
doms are maintained, perhaps even at the cost of political freedoms.
D. Democracy and Equal Rights
While individual freedoms do not affect returns to human capital, the type of
political system does.More democratic political institutions are correlated with
higher returns to schooling across the board, signiﬁcantly so for all groups but
the rural residents. The effect is quite large, approaching a 2 percentage point
increase in returns to schooling when evaluated at sample means. The effect
does not carry over to returns to experience, where the coefﬁcients are consis-
tently small but negative. Unclear is whether the democratic institutions raise
returns to human capital or if, as argued by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005),
countries with better human capital endowments become more democratic.
Progress on equal rights, as indicated by the proportion of women among
elected ofﬁcials, does have a positive correlation with estimated returns to
schooling. The elasticity is about 0.15 overall, larger in urban markets and for
women and smaller for rural residents and males. The impact on returns across
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the population groups is not signiﬁcantly different, so that a 10% increase in
women’s political representation raises returns to schooling for all groups by
about 0.1 percentage point. Any conclusion about the effect of equal access on
returns to human capital more generally must be considered fragile, however,
as we fail to ﬁnd any systematic relationship between political access to women
and returns to experience.
V. Are Returns to Economic Freedom Robust to Alternative Hypotheses?
An obvious concern regarding our ﬁndings thus far is that institutions may be
correlated with other factors that affect returns to human capital. In fact, there
are numerous factors that have been credited with explaining economic
TABLE 3
WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES COEFFICIENTS AND ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF THE
EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS INDEX AND ITS SUBCOMPONENTS
Empowerment Rights
Subcomponent
Marginal Returns to
Education
Marginal Returns to
Experience
Freedom of movement 21.975 2.591**
(.40)
[2.18]
(2.61)
[2.29]
Political participation .815* 2.049
(.1.73)
[.03]
(.47)
[2.04]
Freedom of religion .813 .373
(.77)
[.07]
(1.65)
[.17]
Freedom of speech .672 .122
(1.07)
[.09]
(1.28)
[.09]
Workers’ rights 21.19 2.121
(1.48)
[2.13]
(1.07)
[2.07]
R 2 a .35 .15
x2(5)b 12.3** 11.5**
x2(4)c 10.2** 11.7**
Empowerment Rights Indexd 2.029 2.022
(.14)
[2.02]
(.80)
[2.09]
Note. To correct for heteroskedasticity in the dependent variable, we use the in-
verse variance of the estimated returns to education and experience as analytical
weights in our Stata program. The t-statistics corrected for clustering by country are
reported in parentheses. Associated elasticities are in brackets.
a Coefﬁcients and t-statistics from table 1, col. 1, with associated elasticities.
b These are coefﬁcients from a regression of the form in col. 1 of table 1 with the
ﬁve subindexes of the Empowerment Index used in place of the aggregate index.
c Chi-square test of the joint signiﬁcance of the ﬁve Empowerment Rights subin-
dexes. Critical value at the .05 level is 11.1.
d Chi-square test that the ﬁve Empowerment Rights subindexes can be replaced
by a single aggregate index. Critical value at the .05 level is 9.5.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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growth.Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) reported that 145 different vari-
ables had been shown to explain the cross-country pattern of growth in at least
one analysis. Therefore, it is important to consider whether our conclusions are
sensitive to the inclusion of these competing explanations. We list these com-
peting factors along with explanations of how they could affect returns to hu-
man capital.
A. The Extent and Pace of Economic Growth
There are conﬂicting predictions of how the level or pace of economic devel-
opment will affect the returns to schooling. In the models of Rosen (1983) and
Murphy et al. (1991), the size of the market raises the returns to entrepreneur-
ial skills. Indeed, in the endogenous growth literature more generally, the accu-
mulation of skills or knowledge generates increased productivity and returns to
the innovator. Consequently, we would expect returns to schooling to be great-
est in the most technologically advanced societies.
An alternative view to this suggests that poorer societies will underinvest in
human capital, giving those who are able to affordmore human capital a higher
return to their investment. In the formulation of Becker and Tomes (1979,
1986), wealthier households will invest in schooling up to the point at which
the rate of return on schooling equals the rate of return on physical capital.
Poorer households will cut off schooling even at levels at which returns to
schooling exceed those on physical capital. That suggests that poorer econo-
mies will have higher returns to schooling.
Either view suggests that we must control for the level and pace of economic
development to capture the true impact of economic institutions on the returns
to schooling. Furthermore, as economies develop, they can better afford liberal
institutions, such as democracy, redistributive taxes and transfers, rule of law,
protection of property rights and fromcorrupt governments, and so on. Because
of this correlation between the level and pace of economic development and the
levels of economic or political freedom and democratic institutions, we must
include controls for economic development to avoid missing variables bias.
We use the log of real gross domestic product per capita as our measure of
economic development and the growth rate of real GDP per capita to reﬂect
the pace of economic development. Finally, we include the log of the country
population as a crude measure of the size of the market. These measures are
available from the national accounts compiled by the UN Statistics Division.
B. Life Expectancy
In Becker’s (1994) formulation of the theory of human capital investment, in-
dividuals will continue to specialize in schooling as long as the net present value
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of the investment is positive. For an individual who expects to live longer, it
would then make sense to invest more in schooling; but since human capital
investments are subject to diminishing returns, that individual will realize a
lower annual return per year of schooling. To understand why, consider two
otherwise identical individuals with different life expectancies who complete
the same years of schooling. Both will generate the same marginal increase in
human capital product after completing their last year of schooling, generating
the same resulting marginal change in annual earnings. However, the present
value of the returns from that year of schooling will be greater for the individual
who lives longer. To optimize, the individual with greater expected longevity
should increase schooling, with each additional year generating positive, but
successively lower, annual increments in earnings. Life expectancy at birth is
available for all countries through the World Development Indicators.22
C. Foreign Aid
There are sharp differences of opinion on the role of foreign aid in economic
development. Some have argued that more foreign aid is critically necessary to
foster economic development (Sachs 2005), while others have suggested that
foreign aid has been ineffective (Easterly 2006, 2009). Still others emphasize
the need for internally or externally generated political stabilization (Collier
2007) or a culture of capitalism (Clark 2007) before any economic develop-
ment can occur.
To our knowledge, the debate on foreign aid has not addressed whether and
how aid beneﬁts or hinders economic mobility within a country. Aid may be
critical to the expansion of schooling opportunities and to the improvement of
existing schools, in which case it should raise returns to schooling. Further-
more, to the extent that the aid is accompanied by support for setting and im-
plementing good policies, that aid would improve economic institutions that
could support higher returns. But foreign aid could also insulate the country
from shocks, which would lower the returns to schooling in a Schultz world.
Finally, foreign aid could be misused, in which case its impact would be neg-
ligible. We use the log of real net foreign aid per capita provided by the World
Development Indicators as our measure of the importance of foreign aid in
the economy.
22 When exact matches on years were not available, we interpolated between years. We experimented
also with using average years of schooling. Results are similar; years of schooling are negatively
correlated with average returns to schooling, consistent with the hypothesis of diminishing returns.
However, years of schooling responds to other factors besides life expectancy, including expectations of
returns to schooling, and so life expectancy can more plausibly be viewed as a factor shifting outward
the country’s demand for schooling rather than as a response to returns to schooling.
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D. The Distribution of Skills in the Labor Force
Twomajor factors in changing returns to skill in developed countries have been
the supply of skilled labor and the pace of technological change. Average years
of schooling have risen signiﬁcantly in a large majority of developing countries
over the past few decades as enrollment rates, especially at the basic levels, have
increased. At the same time, information technologies and other capital have
tended to shift relative labor demand toward more highly skilled workers.
Depending on the speed with which the relative supply of skills responds to
that shift in demand, relative returns to skill can be affected. As documented
by Katz and Autor (1999) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), the demand-
side shifts have dominated supply responses since 1980 in the United States
and many other developed countries, leading to rising returns to skills. How
these technological shifts affect less developed economies is unclear in that
production methods in low-wage environments will be less capital intensive.
Nevertheless, we have incorporated a measure of skill share in the labor market
as a control for the relative supply of skilled versus unskilled labor—the frac-
tion of the labor force with at least eight grades of completed schooling.
The reason for adding these controls is readily apparent when examining the
correlation matrix in table 4. Several of these control variables are highly cor-
related withmeasures of economic institutions, especially life expectancy, GDP
per capita, and skill share in the labor force. Therefore, it is important to assess
whether the estimated returns to economic institutions are really a result of
these competing explanations.
Note that these control variables may themselves be subject to reverse cau-
sality. Level and growth of production per capita, ability to attract foreign aid,
skill share of the work force, and length of life might themselves reﬂect the level
of and returns to skills in the country.We do not attempt to estimate this larger
structural model; in adding these factors to the regression, we are interested in
whether our conclusions hold up to competing explanations, whether or not
those explanations meet a rigorous test of cause and effect.
E. Results from the Expanded Model
The estimated model including these control variables is included in table 5.
The inclusion of the variables raises the share of explained variation in returns
to human capital to as much as 49%. As suggested by human capital invest-
ment theory, life expectancy has a consistently large negative effect on returns
to schooling and returns to experience that applies to all populations. Returns
to experience rises with the level of economic development, as indexed by
GDP per capita, but returns to schooling are not signiﬁcantly correlated with
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GDP per capita. Infusions of foreign aid consistently lower returns to human
capital, but the effect is almost always insigniﬁcant. Returns to experience de-
crease as the share of skilled labor in the work force rises, suggesting that skill
and work experience may be substitutes.
Despite the correlation between these factors and estimated returns to hu-
man capital, the conclusions from table 1 hold up quite well. The effect of eco-
nomic freedom on private returns to education and experience are as large or
larger than estimated in table 1 while remaining insigniﬁcant only in rural mar-
kets. We can still conclude that the returns to human capital are enhanced by
economic institutions that allow shocks to occur, that allow individuals to act
in response to those shocks with the expectation of retaining proﬁts from their
actions, and that spread those rights broadly in the population. Those bene-
ﬁts go to both men and women but are restricted to urban residents and to ru-
ral residents who migrate to urban markets. Differences in economic freedom
explain part of the persistent cross-country variation in incomes identiﬁed by
T. Paul Schultz (1998).
A second conclusion from table 1, that more democratic countries have
higher returns to schooling, is still supported by the evidence in table 5. The
magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on the Democracy Index is un-
changed. Relative to absolute dictatorship, returns to schooling are nearly 2 per-
centage points higher in countries at the average level of democracy in the sam-
ple. The effect is even larger for women and is concentrated in urban markets,
where schooling has the greatest potential. Again, returns in rural areas are un-
affected by democratic institutions.
The other institution that appeared to explain variation in returns to school-
ing in table 1, the fraction of parliamentary seats held by women, loses about
50% of its marginal effect and falls in signiﬁcance. It remains signiﬁcant only
for women. In contrast, gaining importance is the globalization index that
measures the country’s openness to foreign investment and information from
abroad. The elasticity at sample means is about 0.6, suggesting that returns to
education are quite sensitive to globalization, even in rural markets. Returns to
experience are largely unaffected by globalization, which is consistent with the
presumption that it is the young who most beneﬁt by open borders to trade in
information and investment.
Two of the control variables have a systematic effect on cross-country vari-
ation in returns to human capital. First is life expectancy, which greatly reduces
marginal returns to both schooling and experience for all populations, as is con-
sistent with Becker’s theory of human capital. The second is the share of more
educated workers in the population; an increase in this share is associated with
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a fall in returns to work experience. This implies that schooling and work ex-
perience are substitutes in production in developing countries.23
VI. Do Economic Institutions Have Similar Effects across the
Wage Distribution?
We have found consistent evidence that freer economic institutions lead to
higher average returns to schooling and experience. That does not mean that
all people beneﬁt or that they beneﬁt equally. There are good reasons to sus-
pect that the most skilled beneﬁt most from freer economic institutions. The
models of Rosen (1983) and Murphy et al. (1991) suggest that it is the most
uniquely skilled whose returns are suppressed under more restrictive economic
policies, so they would gain most when those policies are relaxed. To the extent
that maximizing returns to human capital requires geographic or occupational
mobility, it is the highly educated who gain the most from greater mobility
(Schultz 1988).
Many of the restrictive economic policies are aimed at redistributing income
from the wealthy to the poor. Moderating or eliminating progressive tax rates,
usury laws, minimumwages, and government services would all raise measured
economic freedom, but their elimination might disadvantage the poorest seg-
ments of society, even as they beneﬁt the wealthier groups.
All of these reasons justify an evaluation of how economic or political free-
doms affect returns to schooling at all points along the wage distribution. We
address these issues by using quantile regressions to generate the cross-country
distribution of estimated returns to schooling and experience at various points
on the unobserved wage distribution. The quantile regressions are applied to
the speciﬁcation in (1) at the .10, .50, and .90 quantiles. Similar qualitative and
quantitative results obtain when we add the potentially endogenous covariate
controls, as in table 5.
It is useful to interpret the quantile regressions as moving up the distribution
of unobserved skills. As we move from the lowest to the highest quantile, re-
turns to schooling fall slightly from 8.3% to 7.7% and returns to experience
fall from 1.7% to 1.4%. Presuming declining returns to human capital invest-
ments, the pattern is consistent with complementarities between unobserved
23 Several colleagues askedwhether our results are driven by variation in school quality across countries,
perhaps because countries that score high in economic freedom, women’s political representation, and
democracy are also the countries with the best schools. School quality has been argued to explain
variation in economic growth across countries (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). We replicated the
regressions in table 1 with measures of expenditures per pupil for the subset of countries for which
information was available. None of our conclusions are sensitive to inclusion of that measure of school
quality.
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and observed human capital: those occupying the top income quantiles must
have higher stocks of experience, schooling, and unobservable skills.
Armed with our estimated quantile returns for each country, we repeated the
estimation strategy in (2) to explain the variation in estimated returns to
schooling at each of the quantiles. We also examine evidence for changes in the
effect of institutions as we go from the lower to the upper quantiles. The results
are shown in table 6. We include a test of whether the change in coefﬁcients
between the 10th and 90th quantiles is statistically signiﬁcant.
There is modest evidence that the beneﬁts of economic institutions are
shared unequally across the distribution of unobserved skills, but discerning
a pattern is clouded by the lack of precision in the estimates at the lowest quan-
tiles. Economic freedom is always positively correlated with returns to school-
ing and experience, with the largest returns going to those at the upper quan-
tiles. The impacts of democratic government and of women in the legislature
on returns to schooling are also universally positive, but they increase in mag-
nitude as we move up the quantiles. Apparently freer economic institutions
and more democratic processes will increase wage inequality. However, the dif-
TABLE 6
WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
AND RETURNS TO EXPERIENCE ESTIMATED AT SELECTED QUANTILES
Quantile
.10 .50 .90 .90–.10
Ed:rjt Exp:bjt Ed:rjt Exp:bjt Ed:rjt Exp:bjt Ed:rjt Exp:bjt
Economic Freedom Index .034 .029 .059 .008* .097** .060*** .063 .030
(.58) (.42) (1.48) (.21) (2.30) (2.59) (.82) (.66)
Globalization Index .026 .024 2.020 2.009 2.026 2.030 2.52 2.044
(.55) (.62) (.46) (.46) (.66) (1.12) (1.21) (1.40)
Empowerment Rights Index 2.161 2.080 2.082 2.039 .094 2.036 .255 .044
(.64) (.43) (.37) (.41) (.56) (.41) (1.08) (.32)
Democracy (Freedom
House/imputed polity) .232 2.059 .348* 2.053 .404** .101 .172 .160
(1.28) (.33) (1.92) (.49) (2.50) (1.08) (.77) (1.33)
Women in legislature .078 .029 .107 .005 .106** .005 .027 2.035
(.99) (.67) (1.59) (.17) (2.20) (.19) (.47) (.99)
Constant 3.28 3.19 2.81* 4.92** 2.202 1.46 23.48 21.73
(1.06) (1.22) (1.82) (2.59) (.11) (1.15) (.82) (1.15)
R 2 .09 .05 .18 .02 .43 .13
No. of observations 122 122 122 122 122 122
x2(5)a 7.6 8.2
Note. Dependent variable in the ﬁrst six columns is the estimated return to schooling or return to expe-
rience from the associated quantile earnings function. Inverse of the standard errors of the estimated re-
turns are used as weights. The t-statistics corrected for clustering are in parentheses.
a Joint test of changes in the ﬁve coefﬁcients between the 90th and 10th quantiles, correcting for
clustering.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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ference in returns between the upper and the lower tails are too imprecise to say
deﬁnitively that the returns are higher at the upper tail of the distribution. Fur-
thermore, those at the lower tail are not made worse off—it is just that those at
the upper tail beneﬁt more.
On the other hand, liberalizing these government institutions does have im-
plications for world income inequality. When a developing country raises its
level of economic freedom or becomes more democratic, it raises the wages of
all its citizens compared to earnings in the developed world. This would lower
inequality across countries, even as it may have some modest increase in wage
inequality within its boundaries.
VII. Conclusions
There are sharp differences across developing countries in returns to years of
schooling and work experience that are large enough to explain why between-
country income differences are the dominant source of the world income in-
equality documented by T. Paul Schultz (1988). Theodore W. Schultz (1975)
argued that countries that limit the magnitude of economic shocks or that
limit the degree to which individuals can react to those shocks will eliminate
much of the source of the return to human capital. This article suggests that if
Theodore W. Schultz was correct, then differences in economic institutions
across countries that limit or enhance economic freedom should be a source
of the persistent differences in income levels documented by T. Paul Schultz.
Using the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index as a gauge of the
extent to which a country is open to market forces and allows individuals to
respond to those forces, we ﬁnd broad support for the Schultz hypothesis. Pri-
vate returns to schooling are signiﬁcantly higher in more economically free
countries. The higher returns to schooling persist even when we add measures
of other political institutions that might affect returns and when we add con-
trols for the level and pace of economic development, life expectancy, skill in-
tensity, and population in the country.We ﬁnd similarly higher returns to work
experience in more economically free countries.
The implications for freer political institutions are more mixed. More dem-
ocratic countries have higher returns to schooling, but we cannot isolate the
effect of individual empowerment rights on returns to human capital. Better
access to political careers, as indicated by the share of legislative seats held by
women, seems also to raise returns to schooling, but these estimated returns
are more sensitive to the presence or absence of additional control variables in
the regression.
There is modest evidence that more market-oriented economic institutions
exacerbate within-country wage inequality. However, freer economic institu-
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tions do not lower wages at any point along the ability distribution, and so they
improve the lot of all workers. In addition, because they raise wages in devel-
oping countries compared to the world average, more market-oriented policies
in developing countries will tend to lower the between-country component of
world income inequality.
An interesting implication of these ﬁndings for international migration is
that individuals will experience the largest gains in private returns to human
capital when they migrate from economically repressed to economically free
countries. Should appropriate data exist for international migrants, we should
ﬁnd the largest gap in estimated returns to schooling or experience between ex-
patriates and nonmovers from countries that are the least economically free.
Similarly, looking at the expatriates from a given country, we should ﬁnd the
highest returns to human capital for the expatriates in the most economically
free countries. The least market-oriented countries will experience the greatest
brain drain, or else they will have to use other means to suppress the desires of
their citizens to leave.
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